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INTRODUCTION

The United States Constitution affords equal protection of the laws
to all citizens under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.' The Fourteenth Amendment also contains a Due Process Clause, stating that no State shall "deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law."2 Under the justice
system in the United States we place great weight on a defendant's
right to a fair and impartial trial. The Sixth Amendment guarantees
an impartial jury trial to defendants in criminal prosecutions,' which
has been made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth
Amendment.' States, however, do not have a constitutional obliga* Jeanette Evelyn Walston is a May 2011 J.D. Candidate of Texas Wesleyan University School of Law and will be serving as the 2011-2012 Law Clerk to the Eleventh
Court of Appeals in Eastland, Texas. She offers her sincere thanks to Judge Jim Jordan of the 160th District Court in Dallas County for fostering the underlying idea of
this article; her love and appreciation to her fianc6e, Cory Strange, for his encouragement and motivation; and her thanks to Dan and Loraine Walston, her parents, and
her brother, Jeff "Badger" Walston, for their continued love and support.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
2. Id.

3. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
4. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).
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tion to provide a jury trial in civil lawsuits;' although in Texas, trial by
jury is freely given if timely requested and the fee is paid.'
This Comment explores the right of citizens to be part of the justice
system by exercising their right to sit on a jury. A citizen's right to be
empanelled, however, could directly affect a party's right to a fair and
impartial trial. Thus, some safeguards, such as challenges for cause,
must be kept in place. However, the use of peremptory strikes may be
interfering far more with a citizen's right to sit on a jury than with a
party's right to a fair and impartial trial.
In Rivera v. Illinois, the Supreme Court reiterated that it is up to the
states to determine the existence and exercise of peremptory challenges, although peremptory challenges themselves are not a constitutional guarantee with regards to an impartial jury and a fair trial.'
Although the Supreme Court has left this task to the states, the Court
has held that a juror may not be stricken based on race,' ethnicity,9 or
gender.o This Comment evaluates which states have extended the restriction to other categories such as religion and age and discusses the
extent to which other categories should be included. Thus, as state
law continues to broaden the equal protection of jurors under the
Equal Protection Clause, the question must be asked: When is the exercise of a peremptory strike not purposeful discrimination against a
potential juror?
II.

HISTORY OF THE CHALLENGE FOR CAUSE

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
"[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed .

...""

An impartial

jury can be defined as "a jury not impeded or influenced by improper
instructions on the law applicable to the particular factual issue they
must decide; and not being even possibly influenced by improper
questions intentionally put to witnesses who appear before it."12
Thus, to ensure that a defendant receives a fair and impartial trial,
parties are entitled to an unlimited number of challenges for cause.'
"Challenges for cause are the means by which partial or biased jurors
should be eliminated."14
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R. Co. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211, 216 (1916).
TEX. R. Civ. P. 216.
See Rivera v. Illinois, 129 S. Ct. 1446 (2009).
See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 79 (1986).
See Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 355 (1991).
See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 129 (1994).

11. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
12. County of Maricopa v. Maberry, 555 F.2d 207, 224 (9th Cir. 1977).
13. Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648, 653 n.3 (1987).
14. United States v. Gonzalez, 214 F.3d 1109, 1111 (9th Cir. 2000).
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Parties are not only entitled to challenges for cause in criminal cases
under the Sixth Amendment, but in civil suits as well. In federal
court, "the court may exclude a juror for good cause."' 5 In Texas, a
challenge for cause is defined as "an objection made to a juror, alleging some fact which by law disqualifies him to serve as a juror in the
case or in any case, or which in the opinion of the court, renders him
an unfit person to sit on the jury.""
To disqualify a juror for cause, the party must show either an actual
bias (bias in fact) or an implied bias (bias conclusively presumed as a
matter of law)." "Bias can be revealed by a juror's express admission
of that fact, but, more frequently, jurors are reluctant to admit actual
bias, and the reality of their biased attitudes must be revealed by circumstantial evidence."" "A juror is considered to be impartial 'only
if he can lay aside his opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court . . . ."19 "When a juror is unable to state
that she will serve fairly and impartially despite being asked repeatedly for such assurances, [there] can [be] no confidence that the juror
will 'lay aside' her biases or her prejudicial personal experiences and
render a fair and impartial verdict." 20
Thus, a challenge for cause is the main tool that a litigant can use to
ensure that he or she receives a fair and impartial trial by jury.
III.

HISTORY OF THE PEREMPTORY STRIKE

Chief Justice White stated the history and importance of the peremptory strike best in Swain v. Alabama.2 1 According to Justice
White, English law provided for a number of strikes on both sides, and
was "settled law . . . until after the separation of the Colonies." 2 2 Al-

though peremptory strikes did not continue to be widely used in England, the idea transferred to the States where Congress, early on,
began setting the number of strikes permitted in criminal cases.2 3 The
States promptly followed suit by conferring peremptory challenges by
statute for "both sides in both criminal and civil cases."2 4 Chief Justice Burger also discussed the history and importance of the peremptory strike in his dissent in Batson v. Kentucky,2 5 the landmark case
15. FED. R. Civ. P. 47(c).
16. TEX. R. Civ. P. 228.
17. Gonzalez, 214 F.3d at 1111.
18. United States v. Allsup, 566 F.2d 68, 71 (9th Cir. 1977).
19. Gonzalez, 214 F.3d at 1114 (quoting Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1037 n.12
(1984)).
20. Id.
21. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 212-13 (1965), overruled by Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).

22. Id.
23. Id. at 214-15.
24. Id. at 215-17.
25. Batson, 476 U.S. at 118-20 (1986) (Burger, J., dissenting).
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that changed the use of peremptory strikes in the United States and is
still causing great debate today. His analysis begins with the use of
the strikes in criminal trials by the Romans, where each side was permitted fifty strikes, then moves to the history under English and
American law reiterating Justice White's analysis from Swain.26
In addition to the history, the importance of the peremptory strike
is discussed: "The function of the challenge is not only to eliminate
extremes of partiality on both sides, but to assure the parties that the
jurors before whom they try the case will decide on the basis of the
evidence placed before them, and not otherwise." 2 7 A peremptory
strike is different than a strike for cause in that "[t]he essential nature
of the peremptory challenge is that it is one exercised without a reason stated, without inquiry and without being subject to the court's
control." 28 The Texas Rules of Civil Procedure state virtually the
same principle: "[a] peremptory challenge is made to a juror without
assigning any reason therefor."2 9 Although under current law the underlying nature of the peremptory challenge remains the same, the use
of the peremptory challenge has been somewhat restricted and could
continue to be further restricted, as this Comment will explore.
The number of peremptory strikes a party may exercise has varied
depending on the nature of the case and its jurisdiction. Currently,
each party to a civil action in federal court is allowed three peremptory strikes. 0 For a criminal action in federal court, it varies by what
charge is sought: twenty for each side when the government is seeking
the death penalty;3 1 six for the government and ten for the defendant
when seeking imprisonment of more than a year;3 2 and when seeking
only a fine or imprisonment for less than a year, both sides are allowed three.3 3 The Texas Rules of Civil Procedure require twentyfour prospective jurors, or twelve in county court, to remain on the
panel after strikes for cause have been determined in order for the
parties to proceed in exercising peremptory strikes. 34 "[E]ach party to
a civil action is entitled to six peremptory challenges in a case tried in
the district court, and to three in the county court." 35 In criminal
cases in Texas, it again varies with the type of case: fifteen for capital

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. at 119.
Swain, 380 U.S. at 219.
Id. at 220.
TEX. R. Civ. P. 232.
28 U.S.C. § 1870 (2006).
FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(b)(1).
FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(b)(2).
FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(b)(3).
TEX. R. Civ. P. 232.
TEX. R. Civ. P. 233.
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IV.

THE

A.

375

and five for each side in misde-

BATSON CHALLENGE

History of Batson

In 1880 the Supreme Court started laying the groundwork for what
is now known as a Batson challenge, which began the process of limiting the use of peremptory strikes. The Court, in holding that a West
Virginia statute was unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment, stated that the statute "singled out and expressly denied" the
right of colored people "to participate in the administration of the
law, as jurors." 39 In addition, the Court stated that "[t]he very idea of
a jury is a body of men composed of the peers or equals of the person
whose rights it is selected or summoned to determine; that is, of his
neighbors, fellows, associates, persons having the same legal status in
society as that which he holds."4 0 Therefore, a state denies a colored
defendant equal protection of the laws when colored persons have
been statutorily excluded from the jury.41
More than a century later the Supreme Court held, in its landmark
decision of Batson v. Kentucky, that the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited a prosecutor from using peremptory strikes to exclude jurors solely on the basis that their race
was the same as the defendant's race.42 Initially, under Swain v. Alabama, in order to establish a violation of the Equal Protection Clause,
a defendant had to prove that the State systematically exercised peremptory challenges to exclude blacks from the jury based on race.43
However, the Batson court overruled Swain and instead recognized
that a defendant could make a prima facie showing of purposeful racial discrimination by relying solely on the facts of the defendant's

case. 4 4
Batson states that "the defendant initially must show that he is a
member of a racial group capable of being singled out for differential
treatment." 45 In determining "whether the defendant has made the
requisite showing, the trial court should consider all relevant circum36. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 35.15(a) (West 2006).
37. Id. art. 35.15(b).
38. Id. art. 35.15(c).
39. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308, 310 (1879), abrogated by Taylor v.
Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975).

40. Id. at 308.
41. See id.
42. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 84 (1986).
43. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 227 (1965), overruled by Batson, 476 U.S.
at 79.

44. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 95.
45. Id. at 94.
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stances."4 6 Once the defendant has established a prima facie case,
"the burden shifts to the State to explain adequately the racial exclusion."4 7 At this point, the State must come forward with a neutral
explanation related to the case of why it exercised the peremptory
strike.48 Once the State has come forward with its neutral explanation, the trial court has the duty to decide whether the defendant established purposeful discrimination.4 9 "In evaluating the race
neutrality of an attorney's explanation, a court must determine
whether, assuming the proffered reasons for the peremptory challenges are true, the challenges violate the Equal Protection Clause as
a matter of law." 50
On appeal, the trial court's decision on whether the State came forward with a neutral explanation will stand, unless the reviewing court
finds that it was "clearly erroneous. "' However, the Supreme Court
has not been very consistent on what constitutes a neutral explanation. In Hernandez v. New York, the Court sustained the prosecutor's
explanation that he was doubtful that two venirepersons would be
able to defer to the official translation of Spanish-language testimony
by the court-approved interpreter, as a neutral explanation of striking
two bilingual Latino venirepersons. 52 The Court went on to state that
even if the use of peremptory strikes causes disparate impact,
"[u]nless the government actor adopted a criterion with the intent of
causing the impact asserted, that impact itself does not violate the
principle of race neutrality.",5 But in Snyder v. Louisiana, the Supreme Court reversed the lower court's decision that a prosecutor's
explanation that a prospective a juror's nervous behavior and concern
for missing student-teaching requirements was enough to satisfy the
neutral explanation requirement. 54 The Court held the prosecution's
use of the peremptory strike was "motivated in substantial part by
discriminatory intent."5 5
The Court also reversed a finding of a race-neutral explanation in
Miller-El v. Dretke, holding that "the state court's conclusion was unreasonable as well as erroneous." 5 6 However, in this case, the prosecutor used peremptory strikes on two African-Americans based on
their views of the death penalty, while not pursuing the use of peremptory strikes among other potential jurors who were white and
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id. at 96.
Id. at 94.
Id. at 97-98.
Id. at 98.
Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 359 (1991).
Id. at 369.

52. Id. at 363-72.
53. Id. at 362.
54. See Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 477-79 (2008).
55. Id. at 485.

56. Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 266 (2005).
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made similar comments regarding a death penalty sentence for the
defendant." In fact, the prosecutor's proffered explanation to one of
those strikes was a mischaracterization of the venireman's response
during voir dire." In addition, the Court stated "the appearance of
discrimination is confirmed by widely known evidence of the general
policy of the Dallas County District Attorney's Office to exclude
black venire members from juries at the time Miller-El's jury was
selected.""
In studying these three cases one can see the broad holdings by the
Supreme Court of what constitutes a neutral explanation and when a
trial court's decision will be found to be clearly erroneous. These inconsistencies should be taken into consideration when states are looking to extend Batson challenges or prohibit peremptory strikes all
together.
B.

Batson Extended

Batson originally applied only to criminal cases in which the prosecutor executed a peremptory strike against a juror of the same race as
the defendant.6 0 However, five years later the Supreme Court extended Batson's application of the Equal Protection Clause to civil
trials."

The Court, in Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete, reasoned that

the process of exercising a peremptory strike, whether exercised by a
prosecutor or a civil attorney, was State action because the strike was
permitted by statute and exercised in a court of law, and thus authorized by Congress.6 2 This theory again surfaced when the Court held
that the State could raise a Batson challenge against a criminal defendant's use of peremptory strikes.6 ' The Court stated, "[r]egardless of
who invokes the discriminatory challenge, there can be no doubt that
the harm is the same-in all cases, the juror is subjected to open and
public racial discrimination."'
Three years after the Supreme Court extended Batson challenges to
the civil arena, the Court extended the application of Batson challenges to gender.6 5 In doing so, the Court discussed the similarities
between gender discrimination and racial discrimination throughout
our country's history.6 6 Specifically with regards to jury service, the
Court noted that African-Americans and women share a history of
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id. at 244-52.
Id. at 244-45.
Id. at 253.
See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 82-83 (1986).
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 629-30 (1991).
See id. at 620-22.
Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 59 (1992).
Id. at 49.
See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 129 (1994).
Id. at 135-38.
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total exclusion from the right to serve as a juror.67 To hold that discrimination on the basis of gender was unconstitutional in jury selection, the Court first had to find that peremptory challenges based on
gender stereotypes did not further "the State's legitimate interest in
achieving a fair and impartial trial"6 8 or "provide substantial aid to a
litigant's effort to secure a fair and impartial jury."69 Finding no legitimate government interest, the Court reached the conclusion that gender, like race, could not be used as a basis for striking potential
jurors.7 0 The U.S. Supreme Court has further extended the Batson
application by holding that a Batson challenge does not require that
the veniremember be of the same race as the defendant because the
Equal Protection Clause prohibits racially discriminatory classifications and thus the defendant's race is irrelevant.'
The Hernandez case, discussed above, evaluated the prosecutor's
race-neutral explanation, but referred both to race and ethnicity
throughout the opinion, as the prospective jurors that were initially
struck were of Latino descent.7 2 The Court does not directly hold that
a peremptory strike cannot be based solely upon one's ethnicity.
However, it can be inferred that because the Court evaluated the issue
under Batson, and held that the prosecutor did give a race-neutral reason for striking two venirepersons of Latino descent, that Batson also
extends to ethnicity.7 3
C. Batson Procedure in Texas

The Supreme Court of Texas has laid out a three-step process in
resolving a Batson-Edmonson challenge that mirrors the procedure
laid out in Batson.74 The first step of the process requires the opponent of the peremptory challenge to establish a prima facie case of
racial discrimination.7 1 "During the second step of the process the
burden shifts to the party who has exercised the strike to come forward with a race-neutral explanation." 76 The court in Goode v.
Shoukfeh stated that a neutral explanation is an explanation that
showed "the challenge was based on something other than the juror's
race. 7 At this step the appellate court does not consider "whether
the explanation is persuasive or even plausible."7 8 Instead, "[t]he is67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id. at 136.
Id. at 136-37.
Id. at 137.
Id. at 137-40.
Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 409 (1991).
See Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991).
Id. at 370.
Goode v. Shoukfeh, 943 S.W.2d 441, 445-46 (Tex. 1997).
Id. at 445.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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sue for the trial court and the appellate court at this juncture is the
facial validity of the explanation. 7 9 "In evaluating whether the explanation offered is race-neutral, a court must determine whether the
peremptory challenge violates the Equal Protection Clause as a matter of law, assuming the reasons for the peremptory challenge are
true."so
The third step requires the trial court to determine "if the party
challenging the strike has proven purposeful racial discrimination, and
the trial court may believe or not believe the explanation offered by
the party who exercised the peremptory challenge."s" Once the analysis has reached the third step, the question is no longer a matter of
law, but instead "[t]he issue of whether the race-neutral explanation
should be believed is purely a question of fact for the trial court" to
determine.8 2 In making its determination, the trial court should allow
the party challenging the peremptory strike to rebut the race-neutral
explanation offered by the party exercising the strike. In order to
determine whether the strike was racially motivated, the trial court
should look at "all relevant circumstances." 84
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals "has held that the production
of a prosecutor's juror information notes is both 'necessary and
proper' when the prosecutor refreshes his or her memory regarding
the exercise of peremptory challenges by reviewing those notes before
the Batson hearing."85 Under the Texas Rules of Evidence "if a witness uses the writing while testifying the adverse party must be given
access to it, but if the writing is used before the witness testifies, the
court has the discretion to order the writing disclosed to the adverse
party."8 6 Goode holds "that an Edmonson movant has the right to
examine the voir dire notes of the opponent's attorney when the attorney relies upon these notes while giving sworn or unsworn testimony
in the Edmonson hearing."8 7 "Absent such reliance, the voir dire
notes are privileged work product, and the movant may not examine
them."8
Although Batson challenges and the procedure following a Batson
challenge are made outside of the presence of the jury, just as challenges for cause are made outside of the presence of the jury, "the
proceedings should be held in open court," and the rules of evidence
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 445-46.
Id. at 446 (emphasis removed).
Id. at 452.
Davis v. Fisk Electric Co., 268 S.W.3d 508, 516 (Tex. 2008).
Goode, 943 S.W.2d at 448.
Id. at 449 (citing Tex. R. Evid. 612).
Id.
Id.
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and procedure apply.89 However, "unsworn statements of counsel
may be offered to explain why the peremptory challenges were exercised.""o In addition, juror information cards may be treated as exhibits and offered into the record as evidence, or the information from
the juror card can simply be read into the record so that it appears in
the written transcript of the proceedings.91
In order for the party in opposition of the peremptory strike to preserve a Batson challenge, the party must object to the peremptory
strike and raise a Batson challenge before the jury is sworn.92 On appeal, the standard of review for a Batson-Edmonson challenge in
Texas is "abuse of discretion," which differs from the federal ("clearly
erroneous") standard of review. 93 When "a party offers a facially
race-neutral explanation, a reviewing court cannot reweigh the evidence and reach a conclusion different from that of the trial court
unless . . . the explanation offered is too incredible to be believed."9 4
Given the inconsistencies by the Supreme Court in deciding what
constitutes a race-neutral explanation under a clearly-erroneous standard of review, one could assume that under an abuse-of-discretion
review the results are just as inconsistent. As previously discussed,
states should consider these inconsistencies when determining the
proper method or circumstance in which a party may exercise a peremptory strike.
V.

STATE COMPARISON OF THE USE OF PEREMPTORY STRIKES
AND BATSON CHALLENGES

Recently the Supreme Court of the United States reiterated that it
is up to the states to determine whether peremptory strikes will be
allowed and to what extent a party in litigation may exercise a peremptory strike. 95 The Court also reiterated that it has long been recognized that peremptory challenges or peremptory strikes are not
constitutionally guaranteed to any party in litigation and that states
could abolish the use of peremptory strikes entirely without disturbing
the constitutional guarantee of a fair and impartial trial by jury.96 So
where do the individual states stand with regard to the use of peremptory strikes and the limitation on the use of peremptory strikes that
Batson set in motion?
89. Id. at 451.
90. Id.
91. Id.

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

In re K.M.B., 91 S.W.3d 18, 27 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2002, no pet.).
Id.
Goode, 943 S.W.2d at 448.
See Rivera v. Illinois, 129 S. Ct. 1446 (2009).
Id. at 1450.
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Batson and Religion

In Texas, Batson challenges have only been held to apply to race,
gender, and ethnicity; following the post-Batson holdings of the Supreme Court of the United States." The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals did, however, evaluate whether Batson challenges should be
applied to discrimination on the basis of a potential juror's religion."
In the initial hearing, the court in Casarez v. State held that "the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the use of
a peremptory challenge on the basis of religion absent a compelling
governmental interest."" But, on rehearing, the court changed its
opinion and stated that peremptory strikes could be exercised in discrimination against a person's beliefs.'oo
Like Texas, Minnesota has also directly addressed whether Batson
applies to peremptory challenges based on religious affiliation, and
decided that it did not apply, even when the prosecutor stated she
struck the prospective juror because he was a Jehovah's Witness and
she always challenged Jehovah's Witnesses when possible.' 0 '
In Missouri, a defendant claimed that the state's method of selecting potential jurors from lists of persons with driver's licenses systematically excluded all people of Amish faith because "driving an
automobile is contrary to the Amish faith." 1 0 2 Thus, the defendant
argued that the jury selection process systematically excluded a distinctive group of persons.' 0 3 The court held that the defendant failed
to meet his burden of proof on the issue. 104 However, if a defendant
could show evidence that the jury selection process systematically excluded a distinctive group of persons, the structure of the jury would
be unconstitutional."0 ' The court did not hold that strikes based solely
on religion were unconstitutional in themselves. 0 6
However, several states have reviewed the issue of whether Batson
should apply to peremptory strikes based on religion and found that it
should. The first state to extend Batson challenges to religion appears
to be New Jersey. 10 7 In deciding whether to extend Batson, the New
Jersey Supreme Court looked to its constitution and other state statutes for guidance, 0 s particularly relying on a statute that provided:
''no citizen otherwise qualified to serve as a grand or petit juror shall
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

See Goode, 943 S.W.2d at 444-45.
Casarez v. State, 913 S.W.2d 468, 475 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (en banc).
Id. at 478-79 (initial hearing op.).
Id. at 495-96 (rehearing op.).
See State v. Davis, 504 N.W.2d 767, 767-68 (Minn. 1993) (en banc).
State v. Rogers, 825 S.W.2d 49, 51 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992).
Id.
Id.

105. Id.
106. See id.
107. See State v. Gilmore, 511 A.2d 1150 (N.J. 1986).
108. Id. at 1158-61.
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be disqualified based on race, color, creed, ancestry, national origin,
marital status or sex."o0 Although the case was not subsequently
overturned, nine years later that statute was repealed and not replaced by any similar language.1 10
California also extended Batson to religion-based strikes, although
the court did not directly evaluate the issue head on, but was instead
evaluating a strike based on gender.'
In its discussion of a fair trial,
the court stated, "[e]very criminal defendant has a constitutional right
to a trial by jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the community."1 1 2 This court, like the New Jersey Supreme Court looked to
its state constitution for guidance."' Under the California Constitution, the right to a jury composed of a representative cross-section of
the community "is violated when the prosecution exercises its peremptory challenges to remove prospective jurors on the sole ground
of group bias." 114 The court stated, "[giroup bias exists when a party
presumes certain jurors are biased merely because they are members
of an identifiable group distinguished on racial, religious, ethnic, or
similar grounds." However, the court later held that although exercising a peremptory strike solely on the basis of religion is unconstitutional, "exclusion of a juror on the basis of the juror's beliefs is a
legitimate use of the peremptory challenge."'
The court stated,
"[w]e are persuaded that the peremptory challenge of a juror on the
basis of the juror's relevant personal values is not improper even
though those views may be founded in the juror's religious beliefs." 6
Another state to extend Batson challenges to religion without facing
the issue under a religion-based challenge, was Colorado.11 7 The
court was ultimately deciding the issue of whether jurors with Spanish
surnames constituted a cognizable group that could not be discriminated against, and in its analysis stated:
In order to avoid an open-ended definition of cognizable groups
that could require extensive hearings each time defense counsel
could discern a pattern in the prosecutor's exercise of peremptory
challenges, we believe that a group is legally cognizable if it is defined on the basis of race, national origin, religion or sex.
Florida also relied on its constitution in ruling that people of Jewish
faith are a cognizable group and the purposeful exclusion of Jewish
venirepersons based on their religion violates the state constitution
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:72-7 (West 1974) (repealed 1995).
1995 N.J. Sess. Law. Serv. 44 (West).
People v. Cervantes, 284 Cal. Rptr. 410, 414 (Ct. App. 1991).
Id.
See id.

114. Id.
115. People v. Martin, 75 Cal. Rptr. 2d 147, 151 (Ct. App. 1998).

116. Id.
117. See Fields v. People, 732 P.2d 1145, 1153 n.15 (Colo. 1987) (en banc).

118. Id.
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and state law. 119 The court carefully pointed out however that the
decision was not made under Batson, but under its own constitution

and state law. 1 2 0
The Supreme Court of Hawaii held that "the right to serve on a jury
is a privilege of citizenship" and cannot be taken away because of
"race, religion, sex, or ancestry." 1 2 1 In deciding the case the court
looked at one of its state statutes for support, which provides: "[a]
citizen shall not be excluded from jury service in this State on account
of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, economic status, or physical disability . . .

,"

interestingly omitting the last two provisions of

"economic status" and "physical disability" from the holding. 12 2
Mississippi ruled along the same lines as California in holding that it
is permissible to strike a potential juror for their actual beliefs, even
when those beliefs are founded in religion, but that challenges based
solely on a prospective juror's religion were unconstitutional. 12 3
In accordance with its state constitution, New York found that excluding a prospective juror because he was Islamic violated the juror's
right to serve on the jury, and held that the prosecutor cannot use
peremptory challenges on the basis of religion unless the prosecutor
has a sufficient neutral reason for the strike.1 24
A court in Arizona also agreed that Batson "encompass[es] peremptory strikes based upon religious membership or affiliation."' 2 1
It appears that the states that have extended the Batson principle,
even if not under the federal law of Batson itself, looked closely to
their constitutions and state statutes regarding procedures for jury service and the juror's right to serve on a jury.
B.

Batson and Age

In every federal appeals court that has addressed the issue of
whether Batson extends to age, the decision has been unanimous that
using a strike solely because of one's age does not violate equal protection. 1 26 The First Circuit held that a challenge to jurors between
the ages of eighteen and thirty-four did not violate equal protection,12 7 while the Eighth Circuit declined to extend Batson to peremptory strikes regarding jurors over the age of fifty.128 Several circuits
have held that age is a race-neutral factor under Batson, not an exten119. Joseph v. State, 636 So. 2d 777, 780 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
120. Id. at 781.
121. State v. Levinson, 795 P.2d 845, 849 (Haw. 1990).
122. HAW. REV. STAT. § 612-2 (2007).
123. See Thorson v. State, 96-DP-00144-SCT, 90-DP-00015-SCT ([ 11), 721 So. 2d
590, 595 (Miss. 1998) (en banc).
124. See State v. Langston, 641 N.Y.S.2d 513, 513 (Sup. Ct. 1996).
125. State v. Purcell, 18 P.3d 113, 120 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001).
126. United States v. Helmstetter, 479 F.3d 750, 753-54 (10th Cir. 2007).
127. United States v. Cresta, 825 F.2d 538, 544-45 (1st Cir. 1987).
128. Weber v. Strippit, Inc., 186 F.3d 907, 911 (8th Cir. 1999).
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sion to which Batson should be applied.1 2 9 The Third Circuit discussed that age-based peremptory strikes were subject to rationalbasis analysis and it would likely determine that such strikes are rationally related to the legitimate objective of seating an impartial

jury.1 30

Although it does not appear that any court, federal or state, has
extended Batson challenges to peremptory strikes based on age, a
court in Ohio held that excluding eighteen-, nineteen-, and twentyyear-olds from the list of people to select for jury service violated the
defendant's right to a fair and impartial jury.13 ' The court's reasoning
was based similarly to those states that have extended Batson to religion, in theory that the jury was not made up of a fair cross-section of
the community. 13 2 The court stated that "[a] fundamental objective of
a fair jury system is that no person or class of persons be denied the
right to serve on a jury because of status of race, religion, sex or age so
long as they are competent."1 33
VI.

ARE STRIKES FOR CAUSE SUFFICIENT IN ELIMINATING BIAS?

As discussed above, strikes for cause eliminate bias and ensure that
a party gets a fair and impartial trial-a constitutional guarantee.13 4
However, strikes for cause do not just eliminate bias or prejudice; they
are statutorily created and can eliminate prospective jurors based on a
number of other factors that by law disqualifies them from sitting on
the jury. For example, in Texas, a panelist is disqualified from serving
on a particular case, by law, not only when he or she has a bias or
prejudice in favor or against a party in the case, but also when the
prospective juror is a witness in the case, has a direct or indirect interest in the case, is related by consanguinity or affinity within the third
degree to a party, or has already served as a juror in an earlier trial of
the same case. 35 But, is that sufficient to eliminate all bias?
One argument of course, at least from the trial lawyer's perspective,
is that peremptory strikes allow parties to strike those jurors who did
not quite meet the requirements to be challenged for cause, but that
the attorney can just "feel" are biased against his side of the case. The
other side of that argument is that every potential juror walks into the
courtroom with some amount of experience or knowledge outside of
the evidence that will be presented, and thus eliminating a potential
129. United States v. Bryce, 208 F.3d 346, 350 n.3 (2d Cir. 1999); Howard v. Moore,
131 F.3d 399, 408 (4th Cir. 1997); United States v. Jimenez, 77 F.3d 95, 100 (5th Cir.
1996).
130. Pemberthy v. Beyer, 19 F.3d 857, 871 n.18 (3d Cir. 1994).
131. Ohio v. Willis, 293 N.E.2d 895, 896 (Akron Mun. Ct. 1972).
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. See United States v. Gonzalez, 214 F.3d 1109, 1111 (9th Cir. 2000).
135. TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN.

§

62.105 (West 2005).
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juror's bias, even if it is minimal, toward an issue is nearly impossible.
In essence, using peremptory strikes makes the jury selection process
not about selecting the best jurors for the case, but deselecting the
worst.
The Supreme Court, in Rivera, reiterated that the use of peremptory strikes are not constitutionally guaranteed and that states are free
to abolish them if they so choose. 136 In maintaining that the states are
free to abolish peremptory strikes, the Court seems to be moving toward an era where strikes for cause may have to be sufficient in eliminating bias. If a state does abolish peremptory strikes, or begins to
condemn their use in other categories, such as religion, the result may
be an overwhelming flood of challenges for cause during voir dire.
Such an increase would likely force courts to revisit the rules and procedures for excluding jurors for cause.
However, the rules' need for revision does not automatically mean
a sole reliance on challenges for cause is a bad idea. First, constitutional guarantees for a fair and impartial trial would remain in place,
because one way to eliminate bias in jury selection is to make a motion to strike a potential juror for cause. Second, the juror's right to
serve on the jury would be upheld because the prospective juror is no
longer being discriminated against for her age, occupation, or other
characteristics. In the alternative though, a criminal defendant could
argue that the extended time required to rule on for-cause challenges
violates his Sixth Amendment "speedy"' 3 7 trial right, if in fact those
challenges were to increase in number.
Justice Marshall's concurring opinion in Batson states that the Batson decision "[would] not end the racial discrimination that peremptoThe only way to
ries inject into the jury-selection process."'
accomplish that goal, he stated, was by "eliminating peremptory challenges entirely." 39 Although Justice Marshall was concerned specifically about the misuse of peremptory strikes in order to exclude
blacks from juries, 14 0 his statement could very well be the foundation
for eliminating peremptory challenges on the basis of all types of discrimination against potential jurors.
VII.

AN INDIVIDUAL'S RIGHT TO SERVE ON A JURY

Although "[a]n individual juror does not have a right to sit on any
particular petit jury,"141 individuals do have the right to serve on juries
if they meet the statutory requirements. In addition, "individual jurors themselves have a right to nondiscriminatory jury selection proce136. Rivera v. Illinois, 129 S. Ct. 1446, 1450 (2009).
137. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
138. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 102-03 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring).

139. Id. at 103.
140. See id.
141. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 409 (1991).
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dures."'l4 2 "The opportunity for ordinary citizens to participate in the
administration of justice has long been recognized as one of the principal justifications for retaining the jury system." 4 3 However, the balance between a litigant's right to a fair trial and an individual's right to
serve on a jury seems to complicate the matter.
"Competence to serve as a juror ultimately depends on an assessment of individual qualifications and ability impartially to consider evidence presented at a trial."1 44 It could be argued that an assessment
of an individual's qualifications requires attorneys to discriminate
against potential jurors based on their looks, education level, type of
employment, whether the person has been involved in the litigation
process before, or many other characteristics. But when two constitutional rights are in limbo-the right to a fair trial and the right to serve
on a jury-the right of an attorney to pick a jury that will best decide
the case seems quite inferior. Again, the constitution does not guarantee a perfect trial, but simply a fair and impartial trial. And, "[a]
fundamental objective of a fair jury system is that no person or class of
persons be denied the right to serve on a jury because of status of
race, religion, sex or age so long as they are competent." 1 4 5
In deciding to extend Batson to gender, the Court stated, "the
Equal Protection Clause prohibits discrimination in jury selection on
the basis of gender, or on the assumption that an individual will be
biased in a particular case for no reason other than the fact that the
person happens to be a woman or a man."146 Following this reasoning, it seems that any peremptory strike should be prohibited by the
Equal Protection Clause because when the strike is exercised, it is being exercised under the assumption that that particular individual will
be biased in a particular case for no reason other than the fact he or
she looks a certain way, has multiple tattoos, is wearing black finger
nail polish, looks at the people conducting voir dire in an unusual
manner, or any other characteristic or personality trait.
The Court has also stated, "[u]ndoubtedly, the overriding interest in
eradicating discrimination from our civic institutions suffers whenever
an individual is excluded from making a significant contribution to
governance on account of his race. "147 More generally, the Court
stated, "[r]estricting jury service to only special groups or excluding
identifiable segments playing major roles in the community cannot be
squared with the constitutional concept of jury trial."l 48 Under the
same reasoning, would this not extend to modern day discrimination
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 140-41 (1994).
Powers, 499 U.S. at 406.
Batson, 476 U.S. at 87.
Ohio v. Willis, 293 N.E.2d 895, 896 (Akron Mun. Ct. 1972).
J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 146.
Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162, 172 (2005).
Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975).
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based on religion, political affiliation, sexual orientation, or a number
of other categories in which citizens judge one another? In Edmonson, the Court stated, "by enforcing a discriminatory peremptory challenge, the Court has elected to place its power, property, and prestige
behind the alleged discrimination."' 4 9 If, indeed, strikes for cause
eliminate bias and ensure a fair trial when correctly raised and decided, then any peremptory challenge would be discriminatory in nature against the potential juror. In addition, it would seem that by
refraining from discriminating on any grounds, the court would maintain a more diverse and representative cross-section of the community, and thus impartiality would be guaranteed.
However, strikes made solely on the account of race were prohibited under Batson after the Court applied a heightened scrutiny analysis.'so Similarly, peremptory strikes made on the basis of one's gender
were also prohibited only after the Court applied a heightened scrutiny test to analyze whether there was in fact a legitimate governmental interest in exercising gender-motivated strikes, and found that the
strikes did not further the interests of the state in achieving a fair and
impartial trial.'"' For a juror to challenge a peremptory strike against
him or her on the account of any other type of discrimination, the
juror would have to survive a rational basis analysis. 1 5 2 To survive a
rational basis analysis is virtually impossible, as the party raising the
discrimination claim has the burden of proof, whereas in strict or intermediate scrutiny analysis the burden is on the State. 5 In addition,
the State can defend upon a claim of discrimination under a rational
basis test by coming up with any plausible reason for the discrimination. 1 54 Thus the State, or in this specific situation anyone exercising a
peremptory strike against a category analyzed by rational basis, does
not have to offer the exact reason the strike was based upon during
voir dire, but any plausible reason it could have been based upon.15 5
For example, in U.S. v. Watson the defendant contended that the
prosecutor's strikes of two blind venirepersons could be challenged
under the same line of reasoning used in deciding Batson.1 56 Watson
based his contention on the right to serve on a jury as a fundamental
right and the history of discrimination of disabled persons.1 5' However, the D.C. Circuit stated, "in light of Supreme Court precedent
holding that disabled persons are not a suspect class to which a height149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 624 (1991).
See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
See J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 145.
See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
Id.
Id.
Id.
United States v. Watson, 483 F.3d 828, 829 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
Id.
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. this contention must fail."'

The

court went on to analyze the prosecutor's strikes of the two blind
venirepersons under the rational basis test, and held that the government's reasons for the strikes were in fact "rationally related to ensurHere, the government stated that it
ing a fair trial to Watson."'
exercised the strikes on the two blind venirepersons because a good
portion of the State's evidence would be presented in visual form,
such as photographs and videotapes. 16 0
Thus, it seems near impossible for a prospective juror to succeed
under the rational basis test in proving purposeful discrimination.
This impossibility seems to stem from the balancing of the two
rights-the litigant's right to a fair trial and an individual's right to sit
on a jury. Because a litigant has the right to a fair trial, exercising
peremptory strikes will most likely always be found to be rationally
related to that right. Surely, it would be quite a different situation if
certain people were banned from voting, even though both are civic
duties for all Americans.
Rational basis is not the only obstacle a juror would have to overcome to show purposeful discrimination. "[T]he Towers Court recognized that, although individuals excluded from jury service on the
basis of race have a right to bring suit on their own behalf, the 'barriers to a suit by an excluded juror are daunting." 1 6 1 Initially, some
jurors have no desire to serve on a jury at all. Either the juror does
not want to miss work because his or her pay would be greatly reduced, or the juror does not want to sit in a court and listen to two or
more parties iron out their differences when he or she has his own
"ironing" to do. If indeed the juror did want to serve on a jury, the
juror would most likely be unaware of the intricacies of trial practice.
It is doubtful that the juror would know what a "strike zone" was, or
the difference between a challenge for cause and a peremptory challenge. And even if the juror were to know the differences, it would be
very unlikely that the juror would be able to determine during the voir
dire process how exactly he or she was not selected to serve on the
jury. With none of those facts at the juror's fingertips, it would be
very difficult for a juror to raise a claim of discrimination at all, because yes, the "barriers would be great."
However, the evaluation of standing under Powers and McCollum
sheds light that a juror would be able to bring his or her own suit
against the court for excluding him from serving on the jury.162 Al158. Id.
159. Id. at 835.
160. Id. at 834.
161. Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 56 (1992) (quoting Powers v. Ohio, 499
U.S. 400, 414 (1991)).
162. See id.; Powers, 499 U.S. at 414.
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though in both decisions the context is race, 6 3 it could be reasonably
assumed that the jurors right to initiate suit would be at least as broad
as the particular state's extension of Batson beyond race, ethnicity,
and gender. Yet Justice Thomas notes in his concurring opinion in
McCollum that "[i]n effect, we have exalted the right of citizens to sit
on juries over the rights of the criminal defendant, even though it is
the defendant, not the jurors, who faces imprisonment or even
death." 64 While the defendant is facing loss of liberty, and it most
certainly cannot be argued that liberty is not one of the most fundamental rights in the United States, it is important to note again that
the Court has recently stated that whether or not peremptory strikes
are even allowed to be exercised within a particular state, has no bearing on the right to a fair and impartial trial.16 5
VIII.

CONCLUSION

Constitutional rights with regards to trials and other court proceedings should not be taken lightly. The rights of individuals to have a
fair and impartial trial are firmly based in the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. 166 However, the right of an individual to
serve on a jury is also fundamental. It can be compared to the right to
access the courts, the right to vote, the right to serve the United States
of America by joining the armed forces, the right to work or earn a
livelihood, and many other rights that we deem as part of serving and
contributing to our great nation.
Serving on juries however, is not just a right, but also a duty. The
justice system of the United States would not function if jurors did not
serve on juries and complete their civic duties. Thus, if the justice
system requires individuals to serve on juries so that our system can
continue to function under the notion that cases should be decided by
peers of a representative cross-section of the community, then how is
it that the same system can discriminate against the very people it
requires to maintain its structure?
As Powers and McCollum discuss, a juror would face great difficulty in trying to prove that he or she was struck from the jury based
on some discriminatory reason rather than for displaying bias or
167bohcssao
However, both cases also
prejudice and being struck for cause.
state that the defendant can challenge the peremptory strike for that
very reason, because of the fact that the defendant and the prospective juror are similarly situated.168 Regardless of who is challenging
the discrimination, the juror or a party involved in the litigation, it
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

McCollum, 505 U.S. at 48; Powers, 499 U.S. at 402.
McCollum, 505 U.S. at 62 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Rivera v. Illinois, 129 S. Ct. 1446, 1450 (2009).
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
McCollum, 505 U.S. at 56; Powers, 499 U.S. at 414-15.
McCollum, 505 U.S. at 56; Powers, 499 U.S. at 413-14.
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seems that zero discrimination should exist in a country so rooted in
its beliefs in freedom-freedom of choice in religion, lifestyle, and
other private matters.
In conclusion, because a party's constitutional right to a fair and
impartial trial is not violated by further restricting peremptory strikes
or abolishing them all together, it seems that each state has a duty to
take a second look at its constitution to determine where exactly a
juror's right to serve on a jury comes into play. If indeed the state is
relying on prospective jurors to sustain the justice system that it has
created and maintained on behalf of its citizens, then those prospective jurors deserve an equal opportunity to sit on a jury and uphold
their civic duty, as the state requires, regardless of whether eliminating peremptory strikes based on a certain classification falls under the
Batson reasoning.
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